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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
hree years after a fiery lift-off, the European Company Statute (ECS) is anything 
but popular. Although the numbers appear to be improving gradually, only a 
few companies have taken the leap to become certified as a European Company 
(SE). Several impediments have been suggested as being responsible for this slow 
process, with fiscal issues singled out for particular attention. Against a stifling 
political backdrop for tax-related reform, these risks and costs can deliver a lethal blow 
to the already faltering legislation.  
A range of fiscal issues arise during and following the birth of a SE. In the initial 
phase, the primary concern is the taxes triggered by the transfer of assets. These 
practices run counter to the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital 
fundamentals set out in the EC Treaty. Once properly implemented, new EU laws on 
the taxation of mergers should prevent some of these obstacles. 
But this is not sufficient. More work is needed to eradicate ‘exit taxes’ that are 
used to thwart the change of residence. Recent laws do not explicitly address this issue. 
The European Court of Justice has shown its eagerness to uproot these measures, but 
the Court is effective only on a case-by-case basis. A Community-wide legal 
arrangement is needed to effectively combat the use of exit taxes.  
The problems are far from over once the conversion is accomplished. Provided 
they survive the initial hurdle, major fiscal complications await an SE. The main 
concerns are the undue application of the Value Added Tax (VAT) and uncertainties 
on transfer pricing. 
As for the VAT, the most important concern is that the intra-group transactions 
between a parent company and its foreign affiliates may be deemed taxable by some 
member states. The taxation of these transactions creates a problem of cascading, 
especially in the financial services and insurance sectors, although a resolution seems 
to be in sight for this sector. More generally, there is a need for an initiative for VAT-
grouping. Cross-border arrangements are virtually non-existent within the EU in this 
area. It is highly desirable that the European Commission carries on with its current 
intention to modernise the VAT, especially taking into account the needs of cross-
border businesses.  
In the area of transfer pricing, current regulations that attempt to restrict tax-
motivated profit adjustments lead to significant costs and risks for companies. The 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) promises to wipe out these 
inconveniences once and for all. The CCCTB project appears as a natural tool for SEs 
that would like to reduce their compliance costs and risks. However, there is some 
uncertainty at present about the future of the project. Several low-tax member states 
have objected to the establishment of a consolidated base. Given its ambitious goal, it is 
essential for the CCCTB project to lunge forward and embrace as many pan-European 
corporations and SEs as possible.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
hree years have passed since the deadline for member states to implement the 
European Company Statute (ECS) into their national laws. At the time of its 
inception, the future looked bright for the new company statute. Some pointed 
to the significant cost savings that would result from becoming a single European 
entity. Others were less optimistic. They pointed to the apparent irony that an age-old 
attempt to harmonise the different corporate models would in fact lead to more 
diversity. There was even fear among some observers that the regulation would lead to 
legal arbitrage, as corporations would shop for the most advantageous jurisdiction in 
which to settle. Although the 
reasons varied, all observers 
agreed that the vehicle would 
prove irresistible for an assorted 
set of companies. As for the 
regulators, the regulation was 
widely regarded as a crucial 
measure to complete the Single 
Market and to improve the 
competitiveness of European 
companies. 
The high expectations were 
not unreasonable. Indeed, the pan-
European vehicle yearns to 
achieve a remarkable aim. It gives 
companies operating in more than 
one member state the option of 
being established as a single 
company under European Union 
law. This should enable them to 
operate throughout the EU under 
a single set of rules and with a 
unified management and 
reporting system, rather than 
being subject to the different 
national laws of each member 
state in which they have 
subsidiaries. 
To date, however, only a few 
firms have chosen to convert their 
existing structures to a Societas 
Europaea (SE).  
T 
Box 1. The European Company Statute  
The European Company Statute (ECS) was adopted 
on 8 October 2001 by the Council Regulation on the 
Statute for a European Company (2157/2001) and the 
Worker Participation Directive (2001/86/EC). 
The ECS allows four procedures for creating 
an SE. An SE can be established: 
1.  as a holding company with public or private 
limited companies located in at least two 
different member states; 
2.  as a joint subsidiary of companies from at least 
two different member states; 
3.  through the merger of two or more existing 
public or private limited companies located in 
at least two member states; or 
4.  by transforming a national company that has 
operated in two (or more) Member States for at 
least two years. 
The SE must have its registered office in the 
same member state as the head office. It can be 
moved from one member state to another on the 
basis of a simple procedure. The SE incorporates the 
possibility of one-tier and two-tier boards, in view of 
the fact that both are common in the EU. The 
minimum capital of an SE is €120,000, in order to 
ensure that SMEs can make use of it. 
As a crucial requirement, an SE can only be 
created if there is a consensus on the degree of 
worker involvement, set out by the Worker 
Participation Directive. A set of default arrangements 
detailed by the Directive apply if these negotiations 
are not fruitful. 2 | INTRODUCTION 
 
The popularity of the ECS can be judged by looking at the number of registered 
SEs. At first sight, the situation does not seem so bad. Indeed, the number of corporate 
entities that have chosen to convert to the SE structure appears to be increasing.  
Figure 1 below, which charts the growth of SEs from January 2005 to July 2006, 
distinguishes between operational and non-operational SEs.1 The diagram shows that 
the number of operational SEs has improved more or less constantly since July 2005. 
This is also the case for non-operational off-the-shelf companies.  
Figure 1. Growth in the number of SEs 
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Though steadily growing, the ECS is still in its infancy. 
Note: Non-operational entities include companies with no active operations or employees and 
‘off-the-shelf’ companies that offer newcomers an opportunity to setup their businesses quickly. 
Operational entities include those with active operations and employees.  
Source: SEEurope (2007). 
As informative as it may be, the evolution in the number of SEs does not tell us 
much about the vehicle’s popularity. In order make a sound judgement, the numbers 
should be compared with the legislation’s target audience. In 2004, the EU had over 
40,000 large enterprises, most of which had significant cross-border operations.2 
However, as Figure 1 shows, by November 2007, there were only 61 (distinct) 
operational corporations with registered SEs. This underlines the fact that the ECS is 
still not quite as popular as expected. More worrying, coming at top of the list of 
reasons for creating an SE is the desire to establish a truly European image. Although 
                                                      
1 There are a few instances in which a corporate structure includes two or more SEs. This 
appears to be quite popular for off-the-shelf companies, although a handful of operational 
corporations have also chosen to create more than a single SE. In the figure, corporations that 
contain several SEs are counted only once in order to give a balanced view of their contribution 
to the total number of SEs.  
2 A large enterprise is defined as one having 250 or more employees. CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE | 3 
 
branding is a completely valid and reasonable motive, it is a far cry from the cost-
benefit equation that was expected to entice the corporations to join the ECS. 
What can explain the lack of interest in the SE? Several factors might be 
responsible, for a company that opts for the SE faces a plethora of costs and risks. 
These impediments range from the costs and uncertainties arising from the obligatory 
negotiations on worker involvement to those that result from the redesign of 
operational procedures. The Task Force chose to focus exclusively on fiscal obstacles, 
without going deep on the other equally important dimensions. This approach has not 
been chosen to undermine the importance of other issues but simply to highlight the 
significance of fiscal problems in the current environment, which appears particularly 
hostile to tax-reform. It is also important to emphasise that most of the tax problems 
discussed in the report are common to all pan-European companies, not just the SEs. 
Digging deeper into tax-related impediments, it is possible to distinguish 
between two phases. The first phase comprises the fiscal problems that arise during 
restructuring. Mainly to preserve their tax base, some member states have chosen to 
restrict the outflow of capital. The recent actions of the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) have resolved some of these problems.  
The second phase refers to the period following the initial phase, focusing on the 
fiscal uncertainties and risks that may await an SE even after it endures the initial costs 
of conversion. In terms of indirect taxes, the ‘VAT-groupings’ that provide VAT 
exemptions within a group cannot be readily expanded to cover cross-border 
transactions. There are also reasonable concerns about VAT cascading, i.e. the taxation 
of intermediate goods, services, etc. purchased, especially in the financial services and 
insurance sector. Resolution of these problems is certainly in sight, but the on-going 
work has to be closely monitored and the Commission’s initiatives in this area have to 
be supported.  
On the direct tax front, a variety of questions that surround the proposed 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) are investigated. Conceived as a 
voluntary instrument for multinational enterprises that seek to streamline their fiscal 
liabilities and diminish their compliance costs, the project appears as a natural tool for 
an SE. However, given the resistance of certain member states, it is not certain when 
(and even if) the regime will see the light of day. And even if it does, the current details 
of the project suggest that the new regime may not be all-embracing and thus may not 
solve the problems encountered by some SEs.  
CEPS’ aim in producing this report, and more generally in initiating this Task 
Force, has been to examine the problems that inhibit companies from choosing the ECS 
as a vehicle for simplifying their structures. It is hoped that the report will help make 
the ECS accessible to all companies with significant cross-border operations within the 
EU. 
The next section outlines the fiscal costs that arise during the conversion process. 
These costs are directly related to the taxes that arise from the transfer of assets, which 
may be necessary for SEs born out of restructuring of existing companies. The third 
section addresses the longer term, focusing on costs and risks that are due to direct and 
indirect taxes. Special attention is paid to the current consolidated tax base project, 
which is, however promising, not directly applicable to SEs. The fourth section gives a 
list of policy recommendations and offers conclusions. Two case studies outlining the 
experience of BP and Nordea are presented in an annex at the end of the report. | 4 
 
 
2.  OBSTACLES DURING CONVERSION 
ne of the key aspirations of the SE project is to facilitate the freedom of 
establishment, allowing companies to move within the European Union as 
effortlessly as within a single member state. National laws that obstruct this 
very fundamental freedom also impede the conversion process. This tight knot has 
recently started to unravel as the Commission and the ECJ have acted to discipline the 
individual member states. The next subsection focuses on the direct taxes that arise 
during restructuring. The section closes with a short discussion of the difficulties that 
arise during mergers.  
2.1  Direct taxes due to restructuring 
It was recognised early on that tax issues may constitute grave roadblocks to the 
ambitious plan set forth by the 1970 Proposal for a Council Regulation for the ECS.3 In 
line with this concern, the proposal contained provisions for: 
i)  limiting tax consequences of the title of ownership to stockholders;  
ii)  compensation for losses incurred due to restructuring; and  
iii)  tax exemptions for the transfer of main offices.4  
While the original text was prescient on the impending impact of fiscal obstacles, 
the 2001 Council Regulation contains no specific provisions to clear away these 
obstacles.  
The absence of fiscal provisions in the 2001 Regulation is not surprising and 
certainly not an exception. There is an enormous resistance in the EU to fiscal reform, 
mounted by an almost paranoid feeling that any step forward in fiscal matters will be a 
step closer to the full harmonisation of tax laws and the unavoidable loss of national 
sovereignty. Unable to defend community-wide fiscal priorities for decades, the EU’s 
fiscal void has instead been filled by the independent rulings of the ECJ and the stand-
alone legislation adopted by the Commission. The patchy nature of these initiatives 
and rulings result in grey areas that continue to undermine the overall success of the 
market integration.  
As far as the ECS is concerned, a key issue has been the problems that emerge 
from cross-border transfers and mobility. Intended to be one of the defining 
characteristics of the ECS, cross-border mobility is nonetheless hampered by the lack of 
                                                      
3 The Proposal was adopted by the Commission on 30 June 1970 (COM(1970)600 final) and 
published in the Official Journal (OJ C 124, 10 October 1970, p. 1).  
4 The three tax-related provisions are taken from Lenoir (2007). 
OCORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE | 5 
 
tax provisions. Simple costs that arise during the conversion procedure have simply 
been ignored. For example, certain favourable regimes and privileges have to be 
rescinded once the conversion takes place. It is not clear if these rights can easily be 
reinstated once the restructuring takes place. 
A more dominant problem is the existence of ‘exit taxes’ that are activated once 
assets move out of a member state. Converting an existing structure to an SE typically 
leads to the cross-border transfer of assets, acquisitions and mergers. Most member 
states attempt to prevent such transfers with the use of various impediments, such as 
the taxation of the capital gains.  
Some of these points were addressed by the 1990 Taxation of Mergers Directive.5 
The Directive allowed companies to defer their tax liabilities arising from company 
mergers, divisions, and transfers of assets. The Directive was amended in 2005,6 which 
extends its scope to the ECS, attempting to facilitate the costless transfer of the 
registered offices and the conversion of branches into subsidiaries.  
Although the amended Taxation of Mergers Directive goes a long way towards 
minimising these obstacles, some impediments have not been fully addressed. The 
ECJ’s resolve to stop such practices is evident from its 11 March 2004 Hughes de 
Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministere de l’Economie ruling.7 The case is illustrative of how 
member states adopt tax provisions that create obstacles to the outflow of capital. 
Under French law, French residents who possess equity rights in the country are liable 
when they leave the country to pay a provisional sum on the difference between the 
initial (purchase) price and the reassessed price on departure. When he left France in 
1998, the plaintiff, the late M. de Lasteyrie du Saillant, was held liable for these 
unrealised gains. The ECJ ruled that the practice of imposing taxes not applicable to 
domestic residents was an infringement of the freedom of establishment and was, 
therefore, against one of the most fundamental rights established in the European 
Community (EC) Treaty.  
As far as the French law is concerned, the ECJ ruled that the tax was not designed 
to restrict the change of residency in all cases. Instead, it was designed to limit moves 
motivated solely by tax purposes. The law in question indeed allowed the taxes to be 
deferred and eventually waived them if the relocation was deemed to be permanent, 
that is, if the taxpayer remained abroad for more than five years. The sticky point that 
proved too vexing for the ECJ was that the French tax authorities required M. de 
Lasteyrie du Saillant to post a bond, which would have been waived once it was 
established that the move was permanent. The Court ruled that the practice, however 
temporary, was nevertheless tantamount to a permanent hindrance to the freedom of 
establishment set out in the EC Treaty.  
The de Lasteyrie ruling applied to individuals, but it may nevertheless be used as 
a precedent for companies. The decision certainly has an enormous impact on the 
legality of the practice of exit taxes. Indeed, the Commission, well aware of the 
limitations and ambiguities of the amended Taxation of Mergers Directive, adopted a 
                                                      
5 Directive 90/434/EEC. 
6 Directive 2005/19/EC. 
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Communication on 19 December 2006,8 addressing the implications of the ECJ’s ruling 
on Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant.  
In the Communication, the Commission drew attention to the fact that the 2005 
amendments to the Taxation of Mergers Directive ensured that the transfer of the 
registered offices of an SE from one member state to another would not be hampered 
by taxes on assets that were left behind. However, the amended Directive stipulates 
nothing on the assets actually transferred, either from the member state of origin or yet 
from a third member state. The Communication (p. 5) states that  
… the Commission considers the principles of the de Lasteyrie apply to 
such ‘transferred’ assets. 
In complying with the Court’s decision, the Commission further notes (p. 6) that 
if a member state  
… allows tax deferral for transfer of assets between locations of a company 
resident in that [Member State], then any immediate taxation in respect of a 
transfer of assets to another [Member State] is likely to be contrary to the 
EC Treaty of freedoms. 
With these words, the Commission highlights what it considers to be the 
principle for setting apart fair play from laws that restrict movement. The rules applied 
by a member state to its departing residents must correspond with those applied to its 
domestic residents. Any other way is deemed to be contrary to the fundamental 
freedoms established in the treaty.  
The 2006 Communication should be seen as an attempt to balance the freedom of 
establishment on the one hand and the right to fiscal sovereignty on the other. The two 
principles are at odds when a member state feels obliged to erect barriers in order to 
prevent the erosion of its tax base. As the OECD’s and the EU’s initiatives against 
harmful tax competition demonstrate, some of these impediments are indeed justified.9 
What the ECJ and the Commission have been opposing is the extreme-end of this 
position: Laws that discriminate between domestic transfers from cross-border 
transfers within the EU are discriminatory and should be relinquished.  
                                                      
8 COM(2006) 825 final. 
9 The OECD (1998) endorsed a series of recommendations to distinguish legitimate measures 
from harmful ones. Among these were “the absence of a requirement for substantial activities”, 
which is a relaxation of the usual residence requirements and “the ’ring-fencing’ of regimes”, 
which prevents non-residents who have no substantial activity from benefiting from the 
jurisdiction’s public infrastructure. The EU’s Code of Conduct for business taxation was set out 
in the Conclusions (98/C 2/01) of the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers of 1 
D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 7 .  T h e  C o d e  o f  C o n d u c t  r e q u i r e s  m e m b e r  s t a t e s  t o  r e s t r a i n  p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  a r e  
deemed to be harmful. Drawing on OECD (1998), the criteria for identifying detrimental 
measures include tax incentives for activities that are isolated from the domestic economy and 
granting of tax advantages even in the absence of any real economic activity. Both initiatives 
arise from a need to address harmful measures put in place to attract capital by creating a 
‘residency-lite’ status to individuals or companies who are not interested in residing in the 
jurisdiction. In effect, the status confers tax reductions not available to residents but protects the 
tax base by preventing the entities from taking advantage of the public services. CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE | 7 
 
2.2  Cross-border mergers 
Another major obstacle to forming an SE is that fact that cross-border mergers have not 
been recognised in some EU members. The absence of national legislation in this 
regard, for some member states even after their adoption of the 2001 Regulation for the 
European Company Statute,10 is indeed stunning. 
Recently, the inadequacies of national laws have come under public scrutiny 
with the ECJ’s Sevic Systems ruling of 13 December 2005.11 The case arose from the 2002 
merger request made by Sevic Systems AG, based in Germany, and the Security Vision 
Concept SA, established in Luxembourg. In entering into a merger agreement, the two 
firms agreed to dissolve the Security Vision Concept, transferring its assets to Sevic in 
Germany. The German authorities refused the merger, pointing to the absence of 
provisions governing cross-border mergers in German law.  
Germany was not the only member state that lacked laws authorising cross-
border mergers. Indeed, as recently as 2003, national legislation in the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Ireland, Greece, Finland, Denmark and Austria had also failed to recognise 
cross-border mergers.12 This is all the more surprising given that the ECS Regulation 
had been supposedly implemented by some of these member states at that point in 
time.  
In order to eliminate these obstacles standing in the way of the ECS as well as to 
address other problems regarding employee rights, the Cross-Border Mergers 
Directive was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 26 October 2005.13 Apart from 
requiring that cross-border mergers, divisions, etc. become part of national legislation, 
the Directive addresses other issues that may arise in a pan-European context. Among 
the various elements tackled is the protection of existing employee rights to board-level 
representation. The Directive proposes a solution that is much in the spirit of the 
Directive on Employee Involvement in European Companies (2001/86/EC), which 
involves a negotiation-based solution. It is noteworthy that upon the implementation 
of the Cross-border Merger Directive, all companies taking part in a cross-border 
merger will be subject to the same requirements as an SE. Indeed, one of the main aims 
of the Directive was to pave the way for small and medium-sized companies to merge 
without the need of becoming a SE. The Directive is to be implemented by all member 
states before the 15 December 2007 deadline.  
The ECJ’s Sevic Systems ruling should be seen in light of these developments. The 
decision highlights the Court’s eagerness to uphold the freedom of establishment, even 
though a new law had recently addressed that very point.  
                                                      
10 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001.  
11 ECJ Case C-411/03. 
12 For more on this, see Commission’s 18 November 2003 memorandum, MEMO/03/233. 
13 Directive 2005/56/EC. | 8 
 
 
3.  OBSTACLES AFTER CONVERSION 
he previous discussion centred on impediments that arise during conversion. 
Provided they survive the initial hurdle, major fiscal complications await an SE 
before it becomes operational. On the indirect tax front, how the VAT will be 
applied to an SE remains a major question. As for direct taxes, the main issue is 
whether the consolidated tax base project, which is a simple and unambiguous 
regulatory solution to tax-motivated cross-border profit allocation, will ever see the 
light of day.  
3.1  VAT triggered by cross-border operations 
One concern among companies weighing the costs and benefits of the ECS has been the 
indirect taxes that cross-border transactions typically incur. There are two separate but 
similar uncertainties that may make the post-conversion picture look blurry. First, it is 
not certain if the indirect tax agreements with national authorities will relapse once the 
restructuring takes place. After a company and its branches or subsidiaries take the 
form of a single SE entity, each element will probably have to apply to obtain identical 
agreements. This is not only a costly but also a risky procedure. Certain agreements 
between the corporations and the national tax authorities obtained in the past may no 
longer be available after the conversion. 
Perhaps a more pressing need is a clarification regarding whether cross-border 
operations between a SE’s branches and its parent company will be considered as 
transfers within the same entity and, thus, will be out of the scope of VAT. There is a 
growing uncertainty on this issue, not only in the context of the European Company 
but also in the current environment where cross-border operations, such as mergers 
and acquisitions, have proliferated.  
A complicating factor is that the existing national VAT grouping rules are far 
from being homogenous throughout the EU. In particular, a large number of member 
states do not allow such groups, although that number is constantly shrinking.14 The 
current EU legislation lacks provisions for cross-border grouping. Given that not all 
member states recognise tax groups within their countries, it is questionable to what 
extent these same states would be willing to accept cross-border arrangements.  
There is quite a bit of support for mechanisms that avoid the taxation of transfers 
and services between dependent entities. A recent decision of the ECJ has stirred a lot 
of hope for companies awaiting guidance on cross-border VAT grouping. In Ministero 
                                                      
14 For example, VAT groups have been allowed in Belgium since 1 April 2007, and will be in use 
in Spain starting from 1 January 2008. 
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dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Agenzia delle Entrate v. FCE Bank plc, the ECJ has agreed, on 
23 March 2006, that services rendered by a company in one member state to its branch 
in another member state are outside of the scope of VAT.15 The Court justified its 
d e c i s i o n  b y  r e f e r r i n g  t o  A r t .  4 . 1  o f  t h e  Sixth VAT Directive, which requires that a 
‘taxable person’ is one “who independently carries out in any place any economic 
activity”.16 Accordingly, the Court ruled that subjecting the branches of a company that 
bore no independent financial risk and had no own capital would violate the principle 
put forth in this article.  
The direct application of the FCE Bank ruling to the European Company, 
however, is not immediate: member states might feel allowed to continue to apply 
VAT whenever the organisational structure of an SE allows its branches/subsidiaries 
to take financial risk and own capital. This is more likely to occur when the SE is a 
holding company or in the case of the joint-subsidiary structure as envisioned by the 
ECS. In all these cases, the independence argument raised by the ECJ may lead to the 
taxation of intra-group transactions. 
The application of VAT to transactions between the parent company and its 
foreign dependencies implies a financial burden for the generality of the SEs. It may be 
that the taxes on internal transactions would be credited against tax liabilities, but this 
can only happen with a delay. The reimbursement of excess credits will also take time.  
Most importantly, the taxation of internal transactions could create a serious 
problem of cascading for companies operating in financial services, including the 
banking and insurance sectors. Paradoxically, the issue is problematic precisely 
because these sectors are exempt. In other s e c t o r s ,  V A T  p a i d  o n  s u c h  p u r c h a s e s  i s  
simply taken off from the firm’s indirect taxes on sales. However, since the final 
services are not taxed, financial institutions cannot recover the indirect taxes on their 
purchases of intermediate goods and services. For these companies, the VAT paid on 
internal cross-border transactions could become an unrecoverable cost. In all the cases 
identified above, there will be undue inefficiencies created by indirect taxes since the 
taxation of intermediate products disturbs the efficient allocation of goods and 
services.17 
The problems raised by the treatment of financial services under the current 
Community law are well known and have been recently underlined by the European 
Commission.18 Following public consultations launched in 2006, the Commission 
recently finished work on a proposal for a Directive aimed at allowing financial 
                                                      
15 ECJ Case C-210/04. 
16 Directive 77/388/EEC. 
17 Although almost all forms of taxation are considered to be harmful, it is well known that 
some are less distortionary than others at raising a given amount of revenues. Indeed, it can 
easily be shown that the negative effects of intermediate taxation may be reduced, without 
changing the amount going to government coffers, by simply replacing the intermediate taxes 
with taxes on final goods and services. The misallocation of resources that arises due to the 
taxation of intermediary goods and the second-best alternative were demonstrated analytically 
in the seminal article by Diamond & Mirrlees (1971). 
18 Extensive discussion of these issues may be found in IBFD (2006) and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006). 10 | OBSTACLES AFTER CONVERSION 
 
institutions and insurance firms to claim the VAT on their purchases and intra-group 
transactions, provided that they opt for taxing their services.19 Also, the Commission 
has recently conducted further consultations to address double taxation within the 
EU.20  
Only time will tell whether these problems will be resolved in the near future. 
One thing is certain, however. Given that it has been so hard to achieve some sort of 
harmonisation on the VAT, it is probably not very realistic to expect an instant 
solution.  
3.2  Absence of a pan-European corporate tax regime 
A significant problem standing in the way of the formation of a European Company 
originates from the current direct tax arrangements. National tax authorities have 
distinct ways of calculating profits, allowing different types of deductions and 
accounting methods. Moreover, the absence of a pan-European regime also generates 
costs and risks for corporations engaging in other intra-group profit allocation 
activities. Some national tax authorities may be willing to restrict loss-offsetting. 
Particularly important for SEs, intra-group payments – such as interest payments or 
royalty payments – may be challenged as loans originating from the Head Office, 
which are not allowed.  
Perhaps most critically, the intricate sets of rules that are put in place to prevent 
tax-motivated transfer pricing practices generate significant compliance costs. Indeed, a 
survey published by the Commission in 2004 confirms that transfer pricing is one of 
the chief compliance costs faced by large companies.21 The same can be said for the 
monitoring costs of national tax authorities that scrutinise the legality of these 
activities. 
Apart from direct compliance costs, the regulations also create uncertainties for 
corporations that are simply trying to abide by the rules. Owing to the complexity of 
the regulations currently in use, it is not always clear which practices may raise a red 
flag. This is especially worrying for corporations relying on cross-border operations.  
Even discounting these costs and risks, the current set-up provides an incomplete 
solution without completely eradicating the incentives to look for ways to reduce taxes 
by moving profits from one tax regime to a more preferable one.  
In short, the assortment of incentives provided by the current patchy system 
makes life harder for all parties. A decisive solution is needed to make life easier for 
law-abiding multinational corporations while at the same time reducing monitoring 
costs for tax authorities. The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
                                                      
19 The Commission’s proposal for a Directive (COM (2007)747) to modernise the VAT was 
issued on 28 November 2007.  
20 The consultation, entitled “Introduction of a mechanism for eliminating double imposition of 
VAT in individual cases”, ended on 31 May 2007. More information can be obtained from DG 
TAXUD’s website or the following URL: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/common/consultations/tax/article_3316_en.htm.  
21 The survey’s results are published in European Commission (2004). CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE | 11 
 
promises to wipe out these inconveniences once and for all.22 It does so by pooling an 
entity’s EU-wide profits so that transfers have no impact on a company’s tax 
obligations.  
The envisaged mechanism has three key 
properties. First, it consolidates a 
corporation’s EU-wide corporate income base 
using a common set of rules, that is, a 
uniform set of deductions and accounting 
rules. The proposed scheme thereby aims at 
reducing the compliance costs. It also puts an 
end to the income-shifting activities of 
multinational corporations.  
Second, the tax base is consolidated 
within a company group and is apportioned 
to each entity according to a formulary 
apportionment. Transfer pricing rules will not 
be necessary and the detrimental effects of 
income shifting between the member states 
will be curbed. It should be emphasised that 
the project does not attempt to harmonise the 
tax rates. Individual member states will retain 
the ability to set their own tax rates as they 
please.  
Most importantly, the CCCTB is a 
voluntary measure, allowing eligible 
corporations to choose to opt-in or opt-out. 
This will mean that only eligible corporations 
that see potential gains need to consider the 
measure. Other corporations can continue to 
fulfil their tax obligations under the national 
systems. 
This section will delve into transfer 
pricing regulations and provide a detailed 
explanation of how the CCCTB offers hope. 
There has been some resistance to the project, 
which will be briefly examined. Lastly, the 
eligibility criteria for having an option to join 
the consolidated base may end up excluding 
a large variety of multinational groups, 
including certain SEs. These points will need to be addressed in order to ensure that 
the project will achieve its ambitious goal while at the same time lending itself as a 
useful tool for as many pan-European corporations as possible. 
                                                      
22 The CCCTB project was set to motion in the 23 October 2001 Communication 
(COM(2001)582), later confirmed by the 24 November 2003 Communication (COM(2003) 726). 
Box 2. What is transfer pricing? 
Transfer pricing is one of the principle 
methods used by corporations to allocate 
costs within a group structure. Put 
simply, it refers to the valuation of 
transactions between related entities. 
Where the price reflects the value of the 
good, service or information in question, 
the practice is perfectly legitimate. In 
many instances, however, there is no 
clear guidance on what this value should 
be.  
Suppose that a corporation based 
in the UK has a German subsidiary in 
charge of its human resources services. 
In this case, the transfer price is 
determined by the fees charged by the 
German subsidiary in exchange for its 
services. The market price – the wage of 
a human resources professional in 
Germany – could be legitimately used as 
the transfer price. 
A problem arises when the value 
for the transaction is not evident. In such 
cases, the corporations have an incentive 
to use this ambiguity to their advantage. 
For example, by setting a low price for 
these transactions, the corporation can 
effectively move profits from Germany 
to the UK. This could be preferable for 
the multinational company if, say, the 
German corporate tax rate is greater than 
the UK rate. Used in this manner, 
transfer pricing can effectively be 
exploited as a tool to minimise a 
corporation’s total tax obligations. 12 | OBSTACLES AFTER CONVERSION 
 
3.2.1  Transfer pricing regulations 
Tax authorities around the world have devoted a lot of energy to restrict the use of 
transfer pricing as a tax-planning tool. In many cases, the lack of a simple guidance – 
such as the market price – complicates things, making compliance costly and creates 
uncertainties for firms that are willing to abide with the law.  
Several solutions were proposed to ensure that transfer pricing fulfils its actual 
use, that is, to compensate the transferred goods, services or information received. 
According to the arm’s length principle,  transfer prices should reflect market prices, 
which unrelated parties would agree upon.23 Of course, this is only a notional solution 
and may lead to different interpretations. A related solution, which often employs the 
arm’s length principle, is based on cooperation between the tax administrations of 
member states and companies. Advanced Pricing Agreements (APAs) specify the way 
group transactions among taxpayers established in two or more member states will be 
taxed.24 In addition to the problems associated with the arm’s length principle, the 
agreements are also very time-consuming and cumbersome to obtain. Moreover, the 
agreements do not provide an impregnable solution since companies are asked to 
voluntarily cooperate with the tax authorities to agree on the parameters that will be 
applied in future transactions.  
The CCCTB promises to be a comprehensive solution for the problems relating to 
transfer pricing. By pooling a company’s EU-based profits, the regime simply removes 
the fiscal impact of intra-group profit allocation within the EU.25 Apart from the 
obvious compliance benefits, the regime will also reduce the monitoring and auditing 
responsibilities of national tax authorities.  
3.2.2  Formulary apportionment 
An important aspect of the CCCTB project is how the EU-wide taxable income of a 
group will be shared among the different member states in which a company has been 
active. Currently, Canada and the US are the only developed countries that use a 
consolidated tax base and both have used formulary apportionment to allocate the 
consolidated base for nearly a century. As suggested by many authors, the US scheme 
suffers from non-uniform application of the weighing factors, but the main 
characteristics of the two traditional formulations are quite similar.26 
                                                      
23 The arm’s length was established by Article 9 in OECD (2004).  
24 On 26 February 2007, the Commission decided to adopt EU-wide guidelines (COM(2007)71) 
for advance pricing agreements (APAs), based on the best practice principles identified by the 
EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum.  
25 In addition to transfer pricing, the CCCTB will also resolve problems relating to loss-
offsetting. In essence, the two concepts are closely related, both involving shifting of taxable 
income from one location to another.  
26 For more on this issue, see Hellerstein & McLure (2004) and Martens-Weiner (2005). CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE | 13 
 
Box 3. The main details of the CCCTB project 
In July 2007, the Commission published a Working Paper (CCCTB/WP/057) detailing the 
technical elements of the CCCTB project. The paper was discussed in the eleventh meeting of 
the Working Group on the CCCTB, attended by experts from all member states and held on 
27-28 September 2007. A summary record for the meeting was later made available 
(CCCTB/WP/059). Two additional Working Papers, detailing the potential elements of the 
sharing mechanism (CCCTB/WP/060) and the administrative framework (CCCTB/WP/061), 
were issued in mid-November 2007. On 10-11 December 2007, the Commission held its first 
public meeting to discuss the technical elements and remarks contained in these papers.  
Probably the most striking element of the project is the fact that eligible corporations 
will be able to opt in or out of the CCCTB. In order to incorporate corporations that are not 
wholly contained within the EU, the Working Paper suggests that the measure should be 
extended to non-EU companies with several permanent establishments residing in the EU as 
well.  
The eligibility criterion for consolidation is of major importance. The Commission 
appears to prefer a group definition based on an ultimate ownership of at least a threshold 
amount. Only entities that are owned by at least this threshold will be a part of the group. A 
high threshold is problematic since it impedes large groups from being consolidated. 
However, some member states have shown a preference for high thresholds in order to 
effectively protect the rights of minority voters. Following negotiations in the September 2007 
Working Group meeting, the threshold of having at least 75% ownership was agreed as a 
compromise solution. The December 2007 meetings showed that the businesses have a natural 
tendency to favour low thresholds. 
There is also the question of whether the future Directive could or should contain all 
the technical details. For example, one of the most important pillars of the project, the so-
called ‘first C’, is harmonising the tax base and can only be achieved by bringing the 27 base 
definitions in line. But an extremely detailed Directive would be complex, hard to implement, 
and would have to touch on issues beyond its authority. In order to make the implementation 
procedures simple, the Commission seems to prefer to leave out some of the details to be 
handled later on as implementing measures, based on the comitology powers conferred on 
the Commission by Article 5 of Directive 1999/469/EC. This appears to have raised some 
concerns among some member states. The comitology decisions can be agreed by majority 
voting, which could undermine the unanimity rules set out in the EC Treaty. In any case, 
having a common set of rules is crucial for ensuring that the implemented Directive can really 
resolve the tax planning problems. It seems quite likely that the proposal will have to be more 
technical on this issue. 
A related issue concerns to the accounting standards to be used to calculate the base. 
The Commission has recently ruled out the use of IAS/IFRS standards (COM(2006)157) since 
they are neither suitable for tax purposes nor fully implemented fully by all member states. 
Unless a specific method for calculating the base is explicitly provided in the legislation, the 
national GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) will be taken as a starting point. 
Obviously, such a practice could lead to different base definitions under certain 
circumstances.  
As for the chief administrative details, each group is to have a principal taxpayer, either 
the parent EU company or, in cases where the group is distributed, an entity chosen by the 
group. Among other things, the principal taxpayer has a responsibility to self-assess and 
present its group’s base to the tax authority of member state it resides in, i.e. the principal tax 
authority. The principal authority may issue amended assessments based on audits carried 
out by the relevant tax authorities. Where the re-assessments give rise to disputes between 
two – or more – tax authorities, the issue is to be referred to a central arbitration panel 
comprised of experts.  14 | OBSTACLES AFTER CONVERSION 
 
 
The traditional formulary apportionment attempts to distribute the consolidated 
income by using a pre-determined formula that takes account of factors that are 
believed to contribute to the generation of income. In principle, the apportionment 
could include a wide variety of factors. However, two classes of factors have been 
distinguished. On the one hand, one may include factors that contribute to the origin of 
income, such as the amount of labour employed and capital used by the company. 
Such a mechanism would reward those jurisdictions in which actual production takes 
place, i.e. the supply side. On the other hand, one may consider the contribution of the 
destination-based factors. Implementing such a scheme would highlight the effect of 
activities like sales and marketing on the generation of income, i.e. the demand side.  
The choice of factors has significant consequences on the tax burden borne by the 
company. It is easy to see that the use of factors essentially transforms the corporate tax 
Box 3, cont. 
At the December 2007 meetings, the participants have raised the possibility that this 
centralised panel structure could be too slow to reach a decision and may make audits less 
predictable, augmenting the risks faced by businesses. Although these concerns are 
reasonable, it is quite unlikely that they will materialise. As other participants have remarked, 
the panel would eventually have substantially more experience and authority in dealing with 
tax issues than other judicial bodies involved in cross-border disputes. Therefore, it is more 
likely that it will speed up the procedure and perform its job better, leading to more 
predictability. 
A more heated debate took place when the sharing mechanisms were discussed. Once 
the tax returns are collected, the uniform base is to be distributed among different Member 
States. Each tax authority can then decide the amount it wants to keep, leaving the rest for the 
corporation. The sharing mechanism would need to be derived from several factors to 
determine how much each member state gets. Among the candidate factors are  
•  sales, excluding intra-group transfers, measured either at origin or at destination; 
•  labour input, either the number of employees or the total wages as a unit of measure; 
and  
•  assets, possibly excluding intangibles, inventories and financial assets.  
The discussion of the sharing mechanism focused predominantly on the inclusion of 
sales as a factor. A recent KPMG (2007) survey found that including sales received broad 
support from businesses. However, there is less accord over whether the factor should take 
account of the origin sales or the destination. The Commission seems to prefer the latter as a 
better way of measuring real sales, particularly because it is less able to be manipulated. In 
order to minimise the possibility that non-productive activities are taxed, sales to jurisdictions 
outside the consolidated group are factored out of the apportionment formula. Many 
participants pointed out that the use of sales by destination as a factor would increase the tax 
obligations of many firms. Some have pointed out that sales by destination would also lend 
themselves to manipulation, putting the very use of sales in question.  
The work on a draft proposal will be finished by the summer of 2008. The Commission 
seems committed to have a proposal for a Directive out by early fall 2008. This will ensure 
that the legislation will receive support during the French presidency. CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE | 15 
 
to a tax on factors.27 For example, if the formulary apportionment includes the value of 
property as a factor, then the corporate tax paid by the company in a particular 
member state will increase with the amount of property owned in that state. If the only 
apportionment factor is the property value, then the corporate tax would be equivalent 
to a property tax.  
The most traditional formulary apportionment systems are the three-factor 
formula, based on an equally weighted combination of payroll, property and sales and 
the  two-factor formula (the so-called Massachusetts formula), based on 1/3 weight for 
payroll and 2/3 weight for sales.  
Table 1 summarises the amount of taxes paid by a company that operates in two 
member states under three schemes. The benchmark scheme is equivalent to a 
corporate tax system where any positive profit is taxed at the relevant tax rate. The 
other two cases are respectively the two-factor scheme and the three-factor scheme in 
which the total base is equivalent to the total income generated in all three countries. In 
order to simplify the exercise and make figures comparable, it is assumed that the same 
tax rates are applied in all cases.  
The example depicted in the table assumes that the company has decided to 
locate most of its productive resources in Country A, while making most of its sales 
and marketing in Country B, which is a relatively large market. Country C is home to a 
small facility, probably serving a small market. The last three rows depict the tax 
obligations of the company in each of the three countries under the benchmark and the 
two- and three-factor formulary apportionment rules.  
Table 1. Example comparing 2- and 3-factor formulary apportionment 
 
Country A 
(30% tax) 
Country B 
(5% tax) 
Country C 
(30% tax) 
Total 
Payroll   € 125  € 100  € 25  € 250 
Property   70  20  10  100 
Sales   200  1500  300  2000 
Profits   -100  180  20  100 
Benchmark 0  9.00  6.00  15.00 
3-Factor Case   13.00  2.25  3.50  18.75 
2-Factor Case   7.00  3.17  4.00  14.17 
 
Loss-offsetting helps reduce the taxes paid in Countries B and C under the two 
consolidated base regimes. However, the taxes paid in Country A where the country 
has significant productive presence are significantly higher. Profits no longer 
determine how the tax burden is distributed. The 3-factor system is not beneficial for 
the company since the company has a relatively large property in the high-tax regime 
                                                      
27 This was first suggested by McLure (1980) and was empirically verified by Goolsbee & 
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of Country A. Dropping property as a factor, the 2-factor system leads to low tax 
revenues since labour and sales are concentrated in the low tax regime. Therefore, 
holding the current distribution of resources fixed, the 2-factor system would be 
preferable for the company. 
Naturally, the simple analysis above implies that comparing one case with 
another will always find a winner and a loser. However, it should be kept in mind that 
there are possible savings from reduced compliance and monitoring costs under the 
CCCTB system, which will aid both the fiscal authorities and the taxpayer.  
3.2.3  Resistance to the project 
Like most other pan-European legislative proposals, there is resistance to the CCCTB 
project. Currently, Estonia, Malta, Ireland, Slovakia and the UK oppose the proposal. 
Although there is limited information about the exact reasons for each country, 
Ireland’s Department of Finance28 and several Irish business organisations – including 
the Confederation of Business Individuals (CBI), the Irish Bankers Federation (IBF) and 
the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) – have been particularly vocal 
about their rationale. 
Coming on top of the list of arguments against the CCCTB project is a fear that it 
will lead to a harmonisation of the corporate taxes within the EU. This is certainly a 
fear among member states that have low tax rates, such as Estonia with zero tax on 
retained earnings, Ireland with its 12.5% rate and Slovakia with its 17% rate. Being on 
the lower end of the corporate tax spectrum within the EU, these countries are certainly 
hesitant that the CCCTB will eventually unravel to harmonisation, just like the 
imposition of the minimum standard tax rate requirement in the 6th VAT Directive.29 
The Irish Department of Finance also raises the point that the proposal restricts 
fiscal flexibility. First, the use of the tax base as a policy tool is diminished with the 
application of EU-wide common set of rules to calculate the consolidated base. This is 
indeed one of the distinguishing characteristics of the scheme. Moreover, the system 
will be rather inflexible as any change to the previously agreed base will require 
unanimity.  
Apart from the fear of eventual harmonisation, another reason for opposing the 
consolidated base is that some small member states clearly benefit from income-
shifting activities. Indeed, many companies shift their non-productive activities into 
these member states in order to minimise their tax payments. As the eventual 
implementation of the CCCTB will dismantle these opportunities, companies will no 
longer find these locations as preferable and may direct their attention to looking for 
other opportunities. According to this reasoning, it should not be surprising that some 
business groups would be against the CCCTB project. 
Along the same lines, the apportionment rules may also be troublesome for the 
national authorities of countries that fear a reduction in their tax revenues. It was noted 
                                                      
28 For Irish Department of Finance’s position, see the following URL made public in February 
2007: http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=4543. 
29 Directive 77/388/EEC set the minimum standard rate to 15%, applicable until the end of 
2000, which was recently extended until the end of 2010 by Directive 2005/92/EC. CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE | 17 
 
above that most apportionment rules that are currently in use treat sales as a factor to 
distribute the consolidated EU-wide income among the member states. Although sales 
is one of the many factors used as a proxy of actual economic activity, its use may 
divert corporate taxes from net exporters, such as Ireland. 
Table 2. Extensive use of sales as a factor leads to inferior tax revenues 
 
Country A 
(5% tax) 
Country B 
(30% tax) 
Total 
Payroll   € 100  € 100  € 200 
Property   20  80  100 
Sales   200  1800  2000 
Profits   30  70  100 
Benchmark 1.50  21.00  22.50 
3-factor case   1.50  21.00  22.50 
2-factor case   1.17  23.00  24.17 
 
Table 2 illustrates how tax revenues can diminish for small countries. Country A 
is a small-sized low-tax country. The depicted company has allocated its labour force 
equally in the two countries. The profits in Country A are low due to low sales. The 
company has only a small portion of its property in Country A, but needs, say, a large 
storage space in Country B. The 3-factor case leads to identical results as the 
benchmark. However, the 2-factor case, which assigns a greater weight on sales factor, 
leads to revenue losses for the tax authorities in Country A.  
It should not be forgotten that the scheme, if implemented as is, will be 
voluntary, implying that companies may choose not to take part in it. Although this 
will diminish the validity of the business industry’s argument above, the tax 
authorities are by all means correct in suspecting that their revenues will diminish. 
Indeed, recent research by  Devereux & Loretz (2007) suggests that the voluntary 
consolidated base arrangement would lead roughly to a 1% reduction in tax revenues, 
while a mandatory system would augment the revenues by 8%. 
3.2.4  Concerns about eligibility criteria 
The CCCTB will treat a group of eligible entities that have chosen to opt-in as a single 
tax unit. A chief concern of the Task Force has been that the CCCTB’s definition will 
exclude some multinational groups, including certain SEs. In order to make the project 
achieve its ambitious goal of simplification of tax compliance, the project needs to 
embrace as many corporations as possible.  
There are two approaches to defining what types of entities can be called a group 
for tax purposes.30 The consolidated group can first be established by a test of common 
legal ownership. For example, the group can be composed of all entities which are 
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‘predominantly’ controlled by a common owner, i.e. a parent company. The threshold 
for predominance may be set at 51% or 75% direct and indirect ownership. Under this 
definition, the legal group could include entities with no common activity or 
relationship other than a shared ownership structure. It is easy to see that the legal 
ownership test is relatively practical and clear-cut. For public companies, the 
information is publicly available for the most part. However, the consolidated group’s 
boundaries may be as easily manipulated, potentially giving rise to a new set of tax- 
planning strategies.  
The alternative approach is based on the unitary business condition. In this case, 
the group is expected to be composed of entities that are not only commonly controlled 
but also are related to one another by a single economic aim. In other words, unitary 
business groups are expected to have strong economic interdependence among their 
constituent entities. Although more challenging to manipulate, the economic approach 
leads to no meaningful and practical methods for devising an impartial test. 
As was discussed above in Box 3, it appears that the Commission currently 
prefers the legal ownership structure, with a 75% direct and indirect ownership 
threshold. This is a relatively high percentage. The ECS allows a flexible ownership 
structure and certain SEs may indeed fulfil this condition. However, the threshold may 
be too restrictive for other European companies. Therefore, in its current form, not all 
pan-European corporations or SEs will be able to benefit from the pan-European 
corporate tax regime.  | 19 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
he report highlighted the fiscal impediments to the European Company Statute. 
First, the problems arising during conversion were investigated. For a newly set-
up SE, that is for an existing company operating through subsidiaries or 
branches in different member states, the main concern is the possibility of being taxed 
on the transfer of assets to the new entity. Also, the birth of an SE could give rise to the 
so-called ‘exit taxes’ if the restructuring involves a change of residence.  
These measures run counter to the freedom of establishment and free movement 
of capital fundamentals set out in the EC Treaty. After the amended Taxation of 
Mergers Directive31 is adopted by all member states, which was called for by the end of 
2007, the transfer of assets during mergers will not be taxable. However, exit taxes are 
still a problem and no definitive EU law has been proposed to deal with these 
obstructions head on. While the ECJ has recently shown its resolve to uphold the 
fundamental principles on which the EU is built, it has a power to judge if and only if it 
receives a formal application by an affected party. Consequently, it is entirely possible 
that exit taxes remain a problem when corporations shy away from changing their 
residences and are not able to make a case to begin with.  
The second part of the paper examined problems that have gone through the 
initial phase of conversion. The main concerns were uncertainties and risks arising 
from a lack of clear legal guidance. Among indirect tax issues, the most imminent 
problem is that the member states may impose VAT on transactions between a parent 
company and its foreign affiliates. This implies a financial burden for all SEs. Most 
importantly, the taxation of internal transfers can result in cascading for companies 
operating in the financial sector, which produce mainly tax-exempt services. For these 
companies, the VAT paid on internal cross-border transactions would remain largely 
an irrecoverable cost. Additionally, national VAT-grouping arrangements applied 
under the pre-existing company structure might not be applicable to the SE. Cross-
border arrangements are virtually non-existent within the EU.  
The issue of cascading in the financial sector would indeed not be disconcerting if 
financial services were subject to VAT like other service sectors. In any case, it is highly 
desirable that, following the public consultations launched in 2006, the European 
Commission further energetically pursues action aimed at solving the problems raised 
by the treatment of financial services. This issue could be addressed through a radical 
solution, making financial services taxable, as envisaged by the proposed of directive 
recently presented by the Commission. The adoption of a ‘quasi-group’ for financial 
                                                      
31 Directive 2005/19/EC. 
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institutions, as envisaged by the same directive, would also greatly contribute to 
alleviate the problems.  
The VAT-grouping problem cannot be fully resolved at this moment since there 
is no common approach in this area within the EU. Some member states do not accept 
grouping even domestically while others allow a loosely connected set of companies to 
be included in the same group. At the moment, it is not possible to expect that a 
uniform application of VAT-grouping will emerge within the EU in the near future. 
However, a great deal can be achieved if more attention is devoted to the development 
of cross-border groupings between member states with similar laws. 
As for direct taxation issues, branch profit allocation puts the taxpayer in a 
vulnerable position. The paper investigated the current state of the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base as a possible solution. The project will certainly 
change the scope of cross-border business, creating a wider array of opportunities and 
needs. If implemented properly, the measure will significantly reduce compliance and 
monitoring costs by resolving in one stroke transfer pricing and other profit allocation 
issues. Certain member states appear to be against the project, possibly out of a 
justified fear of losing tax revenues. Nevertheless, the project should go forward as it 
will significantly reduce the amount of resources devoted to compliance and 
monitoring activities, implying cost reductions for both corporations and national tax 
authorities.  
There is some ambiguity about whether the CCCTB will be adopted in a form 
that effectively addresses all the main corporate tax problems that are met by pan-
European companies in general and SEs, in particular. Although conceived as a 
voluntary instrument for multinational enterprises that opt to streamline their fiscal 
liabilities, the eligibility condition to be a part of a consolidated group may end up 
preventing some multinational corporations from taking advantage of the regime. 
Also, even though the common base and the consolidation are two distinct elements of 
the project, they are complementary in delivering the promised benefits. If the project 
went ahead with a less than full implementation of one of these elements, an important  
opportunity address one of the main tax obstacles to the proper functioning of the 
internal market, namely transfer pricing, will be lost. Therefore, neither element should 
be compromised. It is essential that the project is kept intact, embracing as many pan-
European corporations as possible. 
To summarise, the report recommends: 
•  a Community-wide legislative arrangement to uproot exit taxes; 
•  implementation of measures to stop cross-border VAT cascading; and 
•  continuation of the CCCTB project, ensuring that the full benefits of the project 
are available to as many pan-European companies as possible. | 21 
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ANNEX 
CASE STUDY 1 – BP 
A summary of Jurgen de Moor’s presentation at the Task Force meeting, 12 June 2007 
Being one of two largest companies in Europe, BP has a sizeable corporate presence in 
the continent. Europe accounted for about a quarter of the group’s overall profits and 
capital. With its exploration, production, refining, marketing, gas, power and 
alternative energy facilities dispersed within Europe, BP operates through a large 
number of subsidiaries.  
BP’s study of a single entity operating through branches 
 
 
In 2005, the company considered the European Company (SE) in order to 
eliminate corporate barriers both within the group and in interactions with the 
company’s customers, suppliers, tax authorities and other external entities. The 
planned transformation would abolish the subsidiary structure and introduce a single 
entity legal structure that operates through branches located in various countries. The 
chief benefits from conversion were identified as: 
•  BP’s willingness to position itself as a true EU company;  
•  reduced legal and administrative costs of running an international firm;  
•  simplified accounting and direct and indirect tax filings and  
•  an improved platform for EU-wide harmonisation, i.e. systems and support.  
On the one hand, the SE structure offers sufficient incentives as it is. As far as BP 
is concerned, there is no need to introduce supplementary tax savings to make the 
vehicle more enticing. A clear benefit is the reduction of VAT registrations to one per 
country.  CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE | 23 
 
On the other hand, converting a large corporate structure into an SE certainly 
comes with costs. It is possible to dismiss or phase out some of these costs. For 
example, the direct taxes from setting up a new (cross-border) entity may be defused 
by the extension of existing directives to SEs. Similar solutions can also be found for 
indirect taxes. Other potential restructuring costs, however, such as the real estate 
transfer taxes, are currently not addressed by EU legislation.  
Once the SE structure is in place, it faces a number of tax impediments. Among 
the tax risks and excessive corporate tax measures that need to be resolved are: 
•  tax disallowance of intra-group interest and royalty payments to the branches, 
which may be challenged as loans originating from the head office are 
disallowed for tax purposes;  
•  breaking up of the consolidated tax groups (e.g. German Organschaft) defined 
solely for fiscal purposes;  
•  issues regarding branch profit allocation and inconsistencies that remain between 
the tax treatment of foreign branches and subsidiaries of foreign companies 
(some of these issues are mitigated by the ECJ’s Saint Gobain ruling (C-307/97) 
for member states only) and 
•  continuation of existing indirect tax licenses and guarantees and potential 
exposure to random audits triggered by the conversion decision.  
At the end of its examination in 2005, BP found that the tax framework available 
for the SE had not been developed sufficiently. Therefore, the costs and risks associated 
with conversion would likely outweigh the benefits. Further analysis of the SE concept 
was shelved.  
It is important to highlight that the common consolidated corporate tax base 
(CCCTB) will not be sufficient to resolve all the issues identified above. Nevertheless, 
the CCCTB project could be helpful and needs to be available for all SEs.  
 
Jurgen de Moor 
BP – Regional Tax Manager 
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CASE STUDY 2 – NORDEA 
A summary of Margareta Leijonhufvud’s presentation at the Task Force meeting, 13 September 
2007 
Nordea Bank AB is the largest financial institution in Scandinavia. Its parent company 
is based in Sweden, with head offices in Stockholm. The company has a distributed 
legal structure, with subsidiaries in a number of European countries. In addition to the 
main group subsidiaries resident in Finland, Denmark and Norway, the group 
includes subsidiaries and related entities based in the Baltic states, Poland and 
Luxembourg.  
In order to streamline and simplify its complex organisational structure, Nordea 
has recently examined the SE company structure. In addition to the tax issues detailed 
below, the investigation also concentrated on legal and corporate issues.  
In order to proceed towards an SE company structure, Nordea had some tax 
requirements. These requirements were that the transformation must be tax neutral 
both during and after the transition procedure.  
The chosen conversion model was that the head office would remain in 
Stockholm while the local banks in Finland, Norway and Denmark would thereby 
convert to branches under the Stockholm office.  
From this perspective, the concern was that Nordea would experience several tax 
problems that are still not sufficiently addressed through existing local laws or EU 
legislation. These issues were: 
•  tax effects upon change of registered residence/headquarter takes place (in the 
future) 
•  tax effects on shareholders resident outside the EU  
•  tax effects on local accumulated (carry-forward) losses 
•  tax effects on advanced bookings (reserves) 
•  tax effects on intra-group financing (thin cap rules) 
•  tax effects on group contribution (cross-border) 
•  possible double taxation of branch income 
•  exit taxes arising from restructuring 
•  ambiguities regarding transfer pricing rules 
•  future capitalisation requirements (new OECD guidelines and the effect these 
might have on branch income) and the 
•  possible incidence of VAT for transactions within the group. CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE | 25 
 
The most worrying and probable cost driver arises from the uncertainties 
surrounding the exit taxes, carry forward losses, double taxation on branch income and 
VAT. 
It was presumed that the new structure, containing one head office and three 
foreign branches, would lead to no additional VAT costs as a transaction between the 
parent company and a foreign branch has been considered as a non-taxable 
transaction. Lately, however, local tax administrations seem to have changed the 
interpretation of this rule and the EU VAT directive in such a manner that VAT is 
levied on transactions between a parent and its foreign branches. If this obstacle is not 
removed, the additional VAT costs can jeopardise an EU company structure. Initial 
calculations on VAT effects show that out of a 20% synergy effect – for example in a 
centralised service production - only 5.6% remain if VAT is collected on transactions 
between the parent company and a foreign branch.  
 
Margareta Leijonhufvud 
Former Tax Director – Nordea Bank 
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